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Physician Participation in Executions, the Morality of Capital Punishment, and the 




Over the past several years, the most widely publicized issue in capital litigation has been the 
constitutional status of states’ lethal injection protocols. Death row inmates have not challenged 
the constitutionality of lethal injection itself, but rather execution protocols and their potential for 
maladministration. The inmates’ concern is due to the three-drug protocol used in the vast 
majority of capital jurisdictions: if the anesthetic, which is administered first, is ineffectively 
delivered, then the second and third drugs – the paralytic and heartbeat-ceasing agents – will 
cause torturous pain and suffering in violation of the Eight Amendment. Inmates have argued 
that the participation of anesthesiologists or other highly trained medical professionals is 
constitutionally required to minimize the risk of unnecessary suffering.
1
 This litigation, in 
conjunction with evidence that some executed inmates suffered torturous pain, has reinvigorated 
the ethical debate about physician participation in executions. Even though the United States 
Supreme Court has signaled that physician participation is not constitutionally required,
2
 
lawmakers in death penalty states must consider the ethics of physician involvement.  
For many years, commentators supported the ethical ban on physician participation 
reflected in professional ethics codes. However, a recent wave of scholarship concurs with 
inmate advocates, arguing that physicians should be required or at least permitted to participate 
to reduce the risk of unnecessary suffering. 
With some exception, both the anti- and pro-physician-participation literature share a 
     
common premise:  the ethics of physician participation should be analyzed independently from 
the morality of the death penalty. Commentators on both sides agree that it is essential to 
separate the moral status of physician participation from whether the death penalty is a morally 
justified form of punishment. Many opponents of physician participation do not want their 
arguments dependent on a showing that the death penalty is immoral. Inmate advocates in favor 
of physician participation, though, view many grounds for objection as merely a “stalking horse” 
for abolishing the death penalty.
3
 As such they, too, claim that the morality of capital punishment 
is irrelevant.  
This considerable literature on the ethics of physician participation in executions 
implausibly divorces the ethics of physician participation from the moral status of the death 
penalty. Any ethical position on physician involvement requires some judgment about the moral 
status of capital punishment. The moral status of the death penalty is not necessarily dispositive 
of the morality of physician involvement. Rather, capital punishment’s moral status is one 
important factor that must be considered within a complex ethical analysis of the ethics of 
physician participation. As I argue below, if the death penalty is immoral, physicians have reason 
not to be complicit in the practice, yet they could have reasons related to the inmate’s interest to 
participate. In evaluating the strength of relevant considerations and weighing them, it is 
essential to assess the extent to which the death penalty is immoral: how immoral or unjust is this 
practice, assuming it is? Likewise, if the death penalty is morally permissible or even required by 
justice, that fact would affect the reasons physicians have to participate. In fact, even though 
there could still be reasons counseling against physician participation, if the death penalty is 
required by justice, the case against physician involvement is seriously weakened.   
 Recognizing and appreciating the relationship between the morality of capital punishment 
     
and the physician issue is practically important for multiple reasons. First, lawmakers 
considering the issue of physician involvement should understand the relevance of their opinion 
about capital punishment. The case against physician participation is weak if justice requires the 
law to have capital punishment as an option in some cases. Accordingly, the strength of the case 
against physician participation is dependent on whether capital punishment is morally unjustified 
or worse.  
Second, the analysis provided herein can shed light on ethical issues surrounding 
physician participation in other controversial non-clinical care activities. Physician involvement 
in forensic psychiatry, military medicine, medical research, occupational medicine, as well as the 
death penalty, is controversial precisely because physicians and other health professionals 
generally aim to preserve and restore the health of individuals.
4
 The Hippocratic ethic famously 
enjoins physicians to “do no harm.” But forensic psychiatrists may testify that an individual 
should be detained for the good of others, even when such confinement harms that individual.
5
 A 
medical researcher can expose a patient-subject to some risk of harm for the good of others.
6
 
Military doctors may have helped design harsh interrogation procedures employed in both 
Guantanamo and Iraq.
7
 Does it violate medical ethics for physicians to use their special skills to 
harm individuals to achieve a societal goal? Is it ethically permissible for physicians to harm 
individuals for societal interests within some institutional practices but not others? If so, what is 
the ethical difference between physician participation in those respective practices? This article 
aims to shed light on those questions by discussing physicians and executions. Too many ethical 
assessments assume that an appeal to Hippocratic ethics or generally accepted bioethical 
principles are sufficient. An adequate analysis of physician participation in a non-clinical-care 
activity is necessarily much more complex than commonly acknowledged. The ethics of 
     
physician participation within a practice cannot be divorced from the moral status of that 
practice.  
 
Background: Practices and Laws Governing Lethal Injection   
Execution Protocols: The Drugs and the Risks 
All death penalty states use lethal injection, though a few authorize other methods based on the 
date of sentence,
8
 the inmate’s choice,9 or as a backup should lethal injection be held 
unconstitutional.
10
 According to a typical lethal injection protocol,
11
 the execution team inserts a 
primary intravenous line, either as a peripheral (arms, legs, hands or feet) or central (neck, chest, 
or groin) venous line, and then, if possible, an additional peripheral line.
12
  Saline solution is then 
sent through the lines to confirm proper functioning. If the department director approves, a 
barbiturate - either sodium thiopental or pentobarbital
13
 – is injected through the lines, followed 
by more saline solution. After at least three minutes from the start of the barbiturate injection and 
after the team confirms the inmate is unconscious, a team member injects pancuronium bromide, 
a paralytic agent, followed again by saline solution. Finally, a team member injects potassium 
chloride to stop the inmate’s heart. If the electrocardiograph, attached to the prisoner’s chest 
detects electrical activity after five minutes, additional potassium chloride is sent through the 
prisoner.   
In constitutional litigation regarding, death row inmates have asked for required 
involvement of a physician or other highly trained medical professional because of the risk of 
suffering.
14
 If the first drug is delivered inadequately, the pancuronium bromide will cause 
paralysis, and the inmate will be consciously aware while suffocating and unable to 
communicate. The Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is uncontested that, failing a proper dose of 
     
[the barbiturate] that would render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium 
bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride.”15    
If the procedure is administered correctly, the unconscious inmate will not feel the effects 
of the second and third drugs. However, potential problems can cause inadequate delivery of the 
anesthesia. First, a team member must correctly mix the anesthetic solution. Multiple powder kits 
of the barbiturate must be mixed separately with solution and drawn to multiple syringes.
16
 
Inappropriate concentrations can cause inadequate anesthetization.
17
 Members of California’s 
execution team admitted in testimony that when mixing the drugs they “fail[ed] to follow the 
simple directions provided by the manufacturer of sodium thiopental.”18 According to the federal 
district court, this admission “complicate[d] [its] inquiry as to whether inmates being executed 
have been sufficiently anesthetized.”19 
Second, if the intravenous catheter is incorrectly inserted or becomes dislodged, the 
inmate might not be rendered unconscious by the barbiturate, yet the pancuronium bromide will 
have its intended paralytic effect if delivered subcutaneously or intramuscularly.
20
 The risk of 
improper catheter placement and consequent infiltration into surrounding tissue is particularly 
worrisome with some inmates whose veins have been damaged by drug addiction.
21
 Moreover, 
the catheter could “blow out” if the drugs are delivered too quickly, with too much force;22 
different drugs have different proper delivery rates.
23
  
Risks to the inmate are more serious where the personnel monitoring his consciousness 
are unable to assess anesthetic depth competently because they lack training.
24
 During the Baze 
v. Rees litigation, the Kentucky prison warden who monitors inmates during execution “candidly 
admitted: ‘I honestly don’t know what you’d look for.’”25 Other commentary and court opinions 
     
discuss additional potential problems.
26
 However, our discussion thus far provides sufficient 
reason to see why Justice Alito observed that the participation of medical professionals trained in 
anesthesia would minimize the risk of unnecessary pain.
27
 A well-trained anesthesiologist will 
have significant experience and expertise in drug preparation, catheter insertion, drug delivery, 
and consciousness monitoring. 
To eliminate the risk of suffocation and torturous pain, a handful of states  have 
eliminated pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride, choosing to execute with a barbiturate 
overdose.
28
 The remainder of this article, though, will assume a three-drug protocol when 
discussing lethal injection. A switch to a one-drug protocol could affect the ethical analysis of 
physician participation. To illustrate, one might argue that with a three-drug protocol, a physician 
participates not to kill but to ensure proper anesthesia delivery; but with a one-drug protocol, the 
distinction collapses between delivering anesthesia and the death-causing drug. But we will 
assume a three-drug protocol for two reasons: first, the vast majority of capital jurisdictions 
maintain it;
29
 and second, assessing that context should be fruitful to reflection on general moral 
criteria for physician participation in other non-clinical-care activities, such as forensic 
psychiatry and military interrogations. 
  
Physician Participation: Current Codes, Laws, and Practices 
 The American Medical Association (AMA), World Medical Association, General Assembly, 
American College of Physicians, American Public Health Association, and American Society of 
Anesthesiologists all condemn physician participation.
30
 The American Nurses Association, the 
American Academy of Physician Assistants, and the National Association of Emergency 
Medical Technicians also concur with respect to their respective professions.
31
 According to the 
     
AMA, participation includes any act which would directly cause death, would assist or supervise 
another person in directly causing death, or could “automatically cause an execution to be carried 
out.”32 Specifically, the AMA Code of Ethics prohibits prescribing the drugs, choosing injection 
sites, inserting the IV line, inspecting the lethal injection equipment, monitoring the inmate’s 
vital signs, and consulting and advising the execution team.  
Despite the position of medical societies, physicians and other health professionals do 
participate. State laws permit or require the participation of medical professionals, and members 
of the medical community do not unanimously share the ethical position of professional 
societies. Regarding state laws, Professor Deborah Denno published research in 2007 on the 
extent to which laws in capital jurisdictions permit, require, or prohibit physician involvement.
33
 
According to her findings, adjusted slightly for the subsequent abolishment of the death penalty 
in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois, more than half of death penalty statutory schemes 
contemplate the potential presence of a physician at an execution, and more than 40 percent state 
that a physician shall pronounce or certify death.
34
 Many states also protect physicians who 
participate from state medical board disciplinary action.
35
 Even where physicians are not 




Therefore, it should not surprise that physicians are participating.
37
 During litigation in 
2008, Missouri’s Department of Corrections informed the court that its execution team includes 
an anesthesiologist.
38
 In Alabama litigation, an affidavit submitted by the senior warden in 
charge of executions verified that a “medical doctor is on hand to establish a central venous 
catheter” in case EMTs are unable to establish a peripheral live.39 Atul Gawande’s well-known 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine reports interviews with three doctors and a nurse 
     
who admitted (all anonymously except for one) to participation.
40
 In addition, doctors have 
testified in proceedings regarding the efficacy of the drugs,
41
 which arguably violates the AMA’s 
prohibition on actions “which would assist … the ability of another individual to directly cause 
the death.”42 The litigation regarding execution protocols has reinvigorated the ethical debate 
about physician participation, to which we now turn.  
 
The Standard Medical Ethics Approach: Separating the Issues  
The AMA maintains that its ethical rejection of physician participation is not based on any 
condemnation of capital punishment. It deems the death penalty’s moral status irrelevant to the 
physician issue: 
An individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the personal moral decision of 
the individual. A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving 




The AMA claims that even if an individual doctor thinks the death penalty is required by justice, 
she should nonetheless conclude that her involvement would be immoral. In 1994, the American 
College of Physicians and Physicians for Human Rights co-authored with two other 
organizations a report which condemned physician participation.
44
 The first page states explicitly 
that each co-authoring organization “has different viewpoints on the death penalty itself, and all 
members agreed that this report would not take a position supporting or opposing capital 
punishment.”45 Similarly, the president of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, in a letter 
to its members, stated that his subject was “the involvement of anesthesiologists in lethal 
injections[,] … NOT what [anyone] think[s] about the morality or legality of capital punishment 
. . . .”46 
Standard academic commentary also sets aside the morality of capital punishment. For 
     
example, Robert Truog and Troyen Brennan identify their goal as “develop[ing] arguments 
against participation by physicians that are independent of arguments about the morality of 
capital punishment itself.”47 Writing more recently, David Waisel argues in favor of physician 
participation but follows his opponents and other commentators in tabling the morality of capital 
punishment. He acknowledges moral issues surrounding the death penalty, including whether it 
is distributed fairly, but deems them “beyond the scope” of his article; his only purpose “is to 
address physician participation in  . . . lethal injection.”48 In a 2011 article, Lawrence Nelson and 
Brandon Ashby argue that professional organizations should allow each individual physician to 
decide for herself whether to participate, and in doing so, Nelson and Ashby deem it crucial to 
table the morality of capital punishment: “Unfortunately, the debate about the ethics of physician 
participation in executions has been thrown into confusion by the failure to separate this issue 
from the ethical propriety of the death penalty itself.”49 This standard approach to the ethics of 
physician participation deems the moral status of executions normatively irrelevant. 
 Nelson and Ashby are right that some commentators have rebuffed the standard 
approach, resting their conclusions about physician participation – usually in opposition – based 
on their views about the death penalty. Robert Veatch argues for a position diametrically 
opposed to the standard approach: normatively, the moral status of the non-clinical practice – 
whether capital punishment, forensic psychiatry, or other – is everything. Whether physicians 
may ethically participate “is surely settled by resolving the more fundamental societal moral 
question – the morality of capital punishment itself.”50 Arthur Caplan, too, writes that the ethics 
of physician participation depends on “where, how, and for what reasons the death penalty is 
being carried out.”51  
Though Veatch is right that the moral status of capital punishment is normatively 
     
significant, I will argue that it is not necessarily dispositive. The ethics of physician participation 
in executions and other non-clinical care activities is complex, and the right approach resides in 
between the standard view and Veatch’s. To establish that claim, this article will examine anti- 
and pro-participation arguments to show that each one either is unpersuasive without discussion 
of the death penalty’s moral status or implicitly assumes a view on the social worth of the death 
penalty.  
 
Assessing Arguments Against Physician Participation 
Respecting the Prisoner  
The core of medical professional ethics requires physicians to provide competent medical service 
while exhibiting compassion and respect for human life and dignity.
52
 The World Medical 
Association claims that physician participation violates these core obligations. Peter Clark 
agrees, adding that physician involvement “violates the principle of respect for persons by 
denying individuals, who at this stage are the most vulnerable, of their basic dignity and 
respect.”53 
But the practical requirements of compassion and respect for persons, human life, and 
dignity are not so clear in this context for physicians. A physician may reasonably claim that her 
participation is motivated precisely by her respect for the inmate as a person and his dignity. 
Carlo Musso, a physician who opposes capital punishment yet has participated in executions,
54
 
reasonably claims that refusal to participate represents an abandonment of a dying patient.
55
 The 
inmate’s vulnerability requires, not prohibits, a physician to ensure a painless death. In fact, 
Clark’s statement acknowledges that the inmate, nearing execution, is in this vulnerable position 
before the doctor enters the picture. Thus, Musso plausibly asserts that the question is whether a 
     
doctor can help this vulnerable person, and the answer is yes: she can minimize the risk of 
unnecessary suffering.
56
 In addition, an inmate’s mere knowledge of a physician’s presence 
might bring some mental comfort. 
Nevertheless, opponents of physician involvement are not persuaded that a physician’s 
admirable motivation justifies involvement. In their view, motivation is irrelevant because the 
outcome of the procedure – death – is contrary to the inmate’s interests. For instance, Lee Black 
and Hilary Fairbrother, members of the AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs [the 
“Council”], recently write, “Actions that directly and intentionally lead to the death of a patient, 
even one who is required by the state to die, contravene [physicians’ obligation to promote the 
health of their patients].”57 
However, causing death, by itself, cannot be determinative. Withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment causes death and, depending on the circumstances, can be ethically permissible. The 
Council attempts to ethically distinguish the death penalty context from withdrawal of life 
support: 
First, although death may ensue from the physician’s actions, the individual 
patient is voluntarily choosing to risk death upon the withdrawal or withholding 
of care. With capital punishment, the physician is causing death against the will of 
the individual. Second, when life-sustaining treatment is discontinued, the 
patient’s death is caused primarily by the underlying disease; with capital 
punishment, the lethal injection causes the prisoner’s death.58 
 
The first response regards the respect owed to the inmate as a person, but is unpersuasive. Its 
premise is that a dying patient may voluntarily choose to cease treatment but a condemned 
inmate does not choose execution. That is true, but the analogy is inapposite. The dying patient 
has not chosen her disease but chooses to ask her physician to withhold treatment. The 
condemned inmate has not chosen execution but could choose to ask a physician to monitor his 
     
consciousness. In the patient scenario, the disease is a given, a background condition to her 
choice; in the inmate scenario, the sentence is given, a background condition to his possible 
choice, if the state were to grant a choice. The fact that current law does not permit the inmate to 
make such a choice does not resuscitate the AMA’s absolutist position against physician 
participation. Here is a simple response: let the inmate choose to have a physician present. The 
execution would be perfectly analogous to the patient’s disease, and both the patient and inmate 
would voluntarily choose whether a physician intervenes in a manner the patient or inmate finds 
beneficial. The AMA’s argument does not require an ethical ban on involvement, but rather 
speaks in favor of prisoner choice. 
 Nevertheless, an opponent of physician participation might respond that what matters is 
not whether the physician’s involvement would reduce the risk of unnecessary harm; rather, 
physicians may not participate in any practice or procedure that is, overall, contrary to the 
individual’s interests. Because the end-result of the procedure is contrary to the inmate’s 
interests, the rejoinder maintains, physicians must not participate at all. But if a physician 
actually demonstrates respect for an individual inmate with a desire to reduce the risk of 
suffering, why is the procedure’s end-result determinative? What could justify a prohibition on 
participating in such a practice? Let us first turn to the AMA’s second argument.  
 
Causing No Harm: The “Primary Cause” of Death 
Trying to distinguish the life-support withdrawal from lethal injection, the AMA argues that a 
disease is the primary cause of death for the patient refusing treatment, whereas lethal injection 
is the primary cause of the inmate’s death. This assertion also should fail to persuade. The notion 
of a primary or direct
59
 cause cannot do the moral work the AMA intends for it. The  notion of a 
     
primary cause here rings of the tort and criminal law notion of a proximate or legal cause. The 
idea is that some cause, among the infinite set of but-for causes of an event, should have some 
special significance for assigning responsibility.
60
 But, like the identification of a proximate 
cause in criminal or tort law, the designation of one cause as “primary” relative to the infinite set 
of an event’s other causes, is dependent on a moral or policy judgment. Imagine two patients 
with the same disease, receiving life-sustaining interventions. One patient requests her physician 
to cease treatment, and, after proper deliberation and procedures, the physician grants her 
request. The second patient wants treatment, but a malicious physician removes her life-
sustaining intervention without consent. In both cases the underlying disease and the physician’s 
act of ceasing treatment were but-for causes of death. Which cause of death was “primary” in 
each scenario?  If one is tempted to say that the disease was the primary cause of death in the 
first scenario, one should be tempted to reach the same conclusion in the second, assuming one 
refrains from appealing to a moral assessment of the physicians’ respective actions. On what 
basis could we identify the disease as the primary cause of death in the first scenario but the 
physician’s act in the second? The basis would be our judgment that the physician in the second 
scenario violated her obligations to the patient. The “primary cause” analysis is informed by our 
views regarding the physician’s ethical duties.  
Let us return to the execution context and stipulate that a physician’s participation would 
qualify as a but-for cause of death. Now ask whether the primary cause of death was the inmate’s 
sentence (along with the intent of state actors to carry it out), the lethal injection, or the 
involvement of a physician whose intention is to minimize the risk of pain? Any answer to that 
question is necessarily colored by an opinion about the physician’s obligations. To say that the 
physician’s involvement in the lethal injection is the primary cause of death is to already assume 
     
a moral view about the physician’s obligations. As such, the “primary cause” notion cannot do 
any moral work in establishing the physician’s moral obligation to refrain from participation. 
 
“This Is Not a Medical Procedure”  
Many arguments regarding physician participation in controversial non-clinical-care settings 
share an interesting premise: that the controversial use of medical skills and knowledge does not 
count as the practice of medicine. Others argue similarly that when using her skills for a social 
purpose, the physician does not act as a physician.
61
 Strangely, commentators draw opposing 
conclusions from these premises. To some, the premises imply that physicians may participate, 
even if their skills are used to harm an individual. For these commentators, lethal injection’s 
status outside medical practice does not make it unethical; its non-medical status implies that the 
Hippocratic ethic is inapplicable. Jay Chapman, the Oklahoma physician who fathered current 
lethal injection protocols, made this exact argument.
62
 Similarly, David Tornberg, Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs, argues that military physicians who help devise interrogation 
techniques do not breach medical ethics because they “act as combatants, not physicians, when 
they put their knowledge to use for military ends.”63  
Opposing commentators argue that physicians may not participate if the controversial 
activity is outside medical practice because physician skills may not be employed for non-
medical purposes. For example, the American College of Physicians and its institutional co-
authors condemn physician involvement because “execution is not a medical procedure, and is 
not within the scope of medical practice.”64 Linda Emanuel and Leigh Bienen state, “Execution 
facilities are chillingly clinical in appearance, but lethal injection is no more a medical procedure 
than is killing with a knife or a gun.”65 Truog and Brennan argue similarly, asserting that an 
     
execution “lies far outside the medical sphere.”66 
Why would these commentators describe lethal injection as a non-medical procedure? 
After all, as Emanuel and Bienen observe, much about the setting looks medical: syringes, 
intravenous lines, drugs, and, often, medical professionals. Plus, the reason physicians are asked 
to participate is because they possess medical skills and knowledge and, perhaps, the “cultural 
authority” that accompanies them.67 Let us assess two proposals that could explain the claim that 
physician participation is unethical because it is non-medical. 
 
An Alleged Morality Internal to Medicine 
Edmund Pellegrino offers one response. He famously argues that the essence of medicine is 
defined by the good at which it aims, which, on his account, is healing. We perceive medicine’s 
essence when we reflect upon the clinical encounter where the lives of the vulnerable patient and 
knowledgeable physician intersect. According to Pellegrino, whether the goals for which we use 
medicine “are morally good or bad … depends upon whether they fulfill the ends for which 
medicine exists and which define it qua medicine.”68 When the “ends, purposes, and goals” of a 
proposed use of medical knowledge conflict, they “can only be resolved by reference to a 
primary defining good, which takes priority over other goods.”69 On his view, the obligations 
rooted in the universal essence of medicine cannot be sacrificed for other values or goods. Thus, 
when discussing physician participation in an execution, Pellegrino argues that even if (a) a 
physician and inmate have had an ongoing relationship, (b) the inmate requests that the physician 
administer the lethal injection, and (c) the inmate would view the doctor’s participation as 
beneficent, the physician would have a duty to refuse because “the act of killing controverts the 
healing purposes of medicine.”70 Perhaps Black and Fairbrother hold a similar view of medical 
     
ethics in arguing that physician participation is wrongful because it “contravenes their 
training[,]”71 the focus of which is healing and promoting health. 
However, neither the Pellegrino nor Black-Fairbrother view can sustain an ethical 
prohibition against physician participation. Reducing the risk of suffering is also an 
uncontroversial goal of medicine and object of medical training.
72
 When an orthopedist sets a 
broken bone, she will first administer anesthesia to reduce the risk of suffering. The anesthesia is 
not necessary for healing. If it is fair to describe the prison physician’s conduct as fulfilling one 
end of medicine (reducing the risk of suffering) and conflicting with another end (healing), 
reflection on the nature or essence of medicine and medical training will not reveal whether 
participation is ethical.
73
 Physician participation in non-clinical-care activities raises difficult 
ethical questions precisely because they involve “different principles, all of which are internal to 
the role of the physician [and] come into conflict.”74    
Moreover, medical services and technology are used for non-healing purposes in 
numerous contexts
75
 which do not provoke the same moral outcry as physicians involved in 
executions. First, medical services and technology are used in research purely to measure study 
outcomes, not to heal or promote the health of individual research participants. In fact, 
administering a non-therapeutic research intervention is arguably worse than participation in an 
execution if evaluated according to medicine’s “essence”: the non-therapeutic intervention is not 
motivated by a desire to heal or reduce a risk of pain; and because the research setting is similar 
to clinical care, it often causes the therapeutic misconception.
76
 Condemned inmates, on the other 
hand, have no misconception regarding the purpose of the lethal injection procedure. Second, 
consider forensic psychiatry. Imagine a capital defendant who wishes to offer mitigating 
evidence that he suffered from a serious mental impairment at the time of his crime. A forensic 
     
psychiatrist can use her medical training to examine this defendant, then testify that the proffered 
mitigating circumstance is unsubstantiated.
77
 The psychiatric examination had no healing 
purpose, and its outcome ultimately harmed the defendant. 
Pellegrino’s account – in some parts of his writings – of what makes a physician act 
unethical seems mistaken. On his account, what makes a physician act wrongful is that it that it 
conflicts with the universal essence of medicine. However, his view cannot account for the truth 
that when a physician violates a patient’s legitimate expectations, the physician has not only 
done something wrong, but has wronged the patient. What makes a physician’s violation of trust 
wrongful is that it disrespects the patient’s value as a person, as one to whom a duty was owed. 
Common moral principles regarding promise-keeping and meeting others’ legitimate 
expectations justify this conclusion. But, despite Pellegrino’s apt description of the clinical 
encounter, he often denies that the wrongfulness of such acts is explained by their violation of 
common moral principles (such as “one should keep one’s promises” and “one should not exploit 
others’ vulnerabilities”).78 He argues that the foundation of a physician’s duties cannot be 
adequately justified by Kantian considerations regarding the patient’s value as a person.79 Rather, 
Pellegrino argues, the source of medical ethical duties is “in the nature of [medical] professions, 
in what is distinctive about them and the good at which they aim.”80 But the implication is that 
the feature of a physician’s wrongful act which makes it wrongful is that it conflicts with some 
Platonic essence of medicine, as if something were owed to medicine’s essential nature.   
In other parts of his work, Pellegrino offers a more plausible basis for the Hippocratic 
ethic: “The vulnerability of the patient, and the trust patients must ultimately place in the 
physician’s skill, are the foundation for the obligation to be competent in performance as well as 
in knowledge.”81 On this more plausible account, the Hippocratic ethic is justified by the general 
     
moral obligation to respect persons, applied to the specific context in which vulnerable persons 
legitimately expect a physician’s good will. In light of our earlier observation though, the respect 
owed to a death-sentenced inmate does not justify an absolute prohibition on participation: the 
physician can respect the inmate by trying to reduce the risk of pain.  
 
Acting in the State’s, Not Individual’s, Interests 
Other opponents of physician participation describe lethal injection as “non-medical” because it 
is performed for the state’s interests, not the individual’s. Truog and Brennan find physician 
participation “outside the medical sphere” and offensive to medicine’s sense of community 
because it “prostitut[es] medical knowledge and skills to serve the purposes of the state and its 
criminal justice system.”82 Elsewhere, Pellegrino echoes these sentiments, arguing that a 




 The question, then, is why may not a physician use her skills to advance a state or 
societal interest? Should societal or state interests have no weight in reasoning about physician 
obligations?  
 Let us start with the observation that even in clinical care settings, societal interests 
provide physicians with reasons to limit their pursuit of patient best interests.
84
 For example, a 
physician must consider the growing societal danger posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria in 
formulating her policy for antibiotic prescriptions.
85
 A psychiatrist may have a moral and legal 
duty to sacrifice a patient’s confidentiality and chances for psychiatric improvement in order to 
protect an identifiable third party.
86
 Doctors and other medical professionals also have legal 
duties to report child or elder abuse even if knowledge of that abuse was obtained through 
     
interaction with a non-victim patient and disclosure contravenes the patient’s interests. The law 
also imposes on medical professionals a duty to report certain infectious diseases even though 




  One might object that these observations are irrelevant to the ethics of physician 
involvement in executions for the following reasons: First, the examples involve physician 
policies aimed at improving or maintaining health; not the health of each individual patient, but 
the physical health of society. Overprescribing antibiotics threatens public health. Second, these 
examples only demonstrate limits to physician obligations. They are consistent with an ethical 
orientation towards maximizing patients’ best interests and do not show that doctors may use 
their skills primarily for a societal interest.  
 The first objection essentially states that only the promotion of societal health may limit a 
physician’s duty to optimize a patient’s best interests. Why is public health the only legitimate 
limit? Clearly, physicians’ primary role in society is to protect and restore health. But this fact 
does not imply that non-health-related reasons should have no purchase on physician decisions 
and obligations. Indeed, we accept many non-health-related reasons as legitimate limits on a 
physician’s duty of patient loyalty. First, consider their reason not to prescribe extravagantly 
expensive therapies accompanied by little expected benefit. This reason exists even though it is 
not solely about health. Cost is important regardless of whether savings are used to advance 
health. Second, a physician’s personal interests, unrelated to promoting health, represent 
legitimate limits to the duty of patient loyalty. As David Wendler points out, “physicians do get 
to retire, take vacations and have days off, even when doing so is not in the interests of their 
present patients.”88 On a given day, a physician could be quite able to continue providing high-
     
quality care to her patients yet have strong family-related reasons to leave the hospital. She needs 
to find a colleague to cover her patients, but the risk of medical error rises when shift changes 
take place. The coverage change is not in the best interests of the physician’s patients, yet 
ethically acceptable. This point may seem obvious, but its implications are important: despite 
lofty talk of physicians’ duty to individual patients and health in general, we plainly accept non-
health-related reasons as relevant to the scope of physician obligations.  
 The second objection was that examples involving antibiotics and duties to report abuse 
and infectious diseases only justify limits on a physician’s pursuit of a patient’s best interests; 
they do not justify use of medical skills for societal purposes. This objection either ignores that 
physicians have other practical identities besides “physician” or insists that their identity as 
physician must always trump their other practical identities. Physicians are also spouses, parents, 
adult children of their parents, friends, co-workers, community members, and citizens. Each role 
entails its own obligations and responsibilities. A physician’s practical identities as caretaker-of-
patient and citizen can produce conflict. Other professionals have no choice but to grapple with 
moral conflict among their professional, familial, and citizen identities. We should be suspicious 
of a claim that spares physicians this inevitable aspect of moral life by insisting that their identity 
as caretaker-of-patient always trumps their other identities.  
 Now stipulate for argument’s sake that the death penalty is morally justified because it 
effectively deters homicides more effectively than other means. If a physician has the social 
obligation to report an infectious disease to preserve public health even though the report 
provides no direct benefit to the relevant patient, then participation in a lethal injection protocol 
could be less ethically problematic: the physician would be serving the public good (according to 
our stipulation) by lending physician’s cultural authority to the procedure, and bestowing at least 
     
some benefit on the condemned inmate (reducing the risk of suffering). In addition, if societal 
interests can justify limits on the pursuit of patient best interests, then it is reasonable that a 
societal interest could be so strong as to require or permit a physician to use her skills for 
advancing that societal interest (assuming certain conditions hold, such as the state interest is 
legitimate). Our society and the medical profession do, in fact, accept physician use of medical 
skills for societal purposes, even when they use those skills directly on individuals. In the next 
sub-section, I argue that medical research represents one such context and emphasize the 
normative significance of the worth of medical research in justifying physician participation. The 
aim of the discussion is to demonstrate the normative significance of the alleged purpose of 
capital punishment to the ethics of physician participation in lethal injection. 
 
Normative Significance of the Goal of the Non-Clinical-Care Activity 
(a) Human subjects research  
Physicians and other health professionals conduct human subjects research. The purpose of 
research is to produce generalizable knowledge about health, conditions and illnesses, and the 
safety and effectiveness of therapies and diagnostic instruments, with hopes of improving 
medical care for future patients.
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 The practice of clinical research is not the documentation of 
findings in clinical care interactions. As explained below, research does not embrace the 
Hippocratic ethical orientation. Is it morally permissible for physicians and other health 
professionals to engage in clinical research? The socially valuable goals of medical research and 
the important role that doctors play in pursuing its goals are normatively significant for 
determining the ethics of physician participation in the practice.  
 First, note crucial differences between medical research and clinical care. Because the 
     
purpose of research is to produce generalizable knowledge, physicians necessarily treat patient-
subjects differently than clinical care patients. In clinical care, a doctor orders treatments and 
diagnostic tests for an individual patient based on the needs and characteristics of that individual. 
The physician’s duty is to tailor the course of treatment or series of diagnostic measures 
according to the individual’s needs.90 In research, however, valid scientific results require 
controlled experimentation, which implies that a protocol’s scientific design determines 
treatment and diagnostic measures, often precluding individualized tailoring.
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 To secure 
scientifically valid results, some protocols limit treatments to those prescribed by protocol 
regardless of whether an individual patient-subject’s well-being would be maximized by a 
tailored course of treatment.
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 In addition, protocols often require patient-subjects to undergo 
non-therapeutic procedures that are necessary to measure study outcomes yet present pain and/or 
risk of other harm, even though such procedures are not clinically indicated for each patient-
subject.
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 In clinical care, a physician may perform or recommend a lumbar puncture, biopsy, CT 
scan, or other medical procedure only if its risks are outweighed by potential benefit to the 
patient. But in research, these procedures are used for scientific purposes without contribution to 
the patient-subjects’ well-being. Even in therapeutic research, doctors expose patient-subjects to 
risks that are for the good of society, not to benefit the individual.  
 Yet professional medical organizations do not call for physicians to halt clinical research. 
Moreover, law permits exposing patient-subjects to limited risk for the good of others. The 
federal regulations state that to approve research, an institutional review board must find that 
“[r]isks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the 
importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”94 In other words, 
research is approvable even if it presents risks to patient-subjects that are not outweighed by 
     
potential direct benefit to its patient-subjects; the importance of generalizable knowledge is 
placed on the benefit side of the scales. 
 Why is physician participation in this activity morally justified? We need to explain why 
the Hippocratic ethic does not bind physician-researchers in the research setting. 
 Any satisfactory answer must begin, though not end, with recognizing the distinct and 
normatively significant goal of research.
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 The production of generalizable medical knowledge 
has great social value, which provides powerful reason to search for an ethically acceptable way 
for physicians to pursue that goal while respecting patient-subjects and safeguarding the medical 
profession’s primary identity. Regardless of whether exposing persons to some research risks for 
the good of others is ultimately justifiable, it is crucial to recognize why we have good reason to 
articulate ethical principles for physician-researchers that deviate from the Hippocratic ethic. We 
have good reasons to permit physicians to expose patient-subjects to some limited and 
reasonable risk in research because of (a) the significant social value of generalizable medical 
knowledge, the goal of research, and (b) the significant social value of having physicians 
involved in the production of that end. 
 If pursuing the goals of research cannot be done without disrespecting patient-subjects as 
persons, then physician-researchers may not deviate from the Hippocratic ethic. However, as it 
turns out, it is ethically acceptable for physician-researchers to expose patient-subjects, in many 
circumstances, to some limited risk for the good of others.  A distinct set of ethical standards for 
research exists that is sufficient for respecting patient-subjects without endangering physicians’ 
core identity. Though we cannot and need not detail here all obligations owed to patient-subjects, 
they include duties which aim to protect patient-subjects from exploitation and unjustifiable 
harm:
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 Physician-researchers must minimize risks to patient-subjects and ensure that those risks 
     
are proportionate to the potential benefits to them and society. Accordingly, physician-
researchers must protect patient-subjects from risks that are unnecessary for answering a socially 
valuable and scientifically important question. To respect the autonomy of potential patient-
subjects, physician-investigators must disclose conflicts of interest and provide true and 
digestible information about the protocol, including its purpose, potential risks and benefits, and 
alternatives in the clinical care settings. Physician-researchers must invite potential patient-
subjects based on scientific objectives, not on vulnerability or privilege. These and other 
obligations demonstrate a respectful stance towards research participants without binding 
investigators to the Hippcratic ethic. 
  
Implications for Physicians and Lethal Injection 
The great social value of research and of having physicians participate are normatively 
significant: they provide strong reason to divorce the ethics of research from the ethics of clinical 
care, given that the latter would prohibit physicians from involvement in many valuable 
protocols. Accordingly, to see the connection between the ethics of physician participation in 
executions and the morality of capital punishment, let us stipulate again that the practice of 
capital punishment has great social value, whether because it is required by justice, reduces the 
number of murder victims better than other deterrents, or both.
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 Moreover, let us stipulate that it 
is valuable to have physicians involved in lethal injection because physicians do reduce the risk 
of undue suffering.  
These stipulations, if true, would significantly strengthen the case for physician 
involvement. They provide good reason to construe the ethics of physician involvement 
differently than the ethics of clinical care. As with medical research, though, we would have to 
     
determine whether physician involvement is consistent with the duties owed to the condemned 
prisoners. Our earlier discussion is relevant here. Assuming (based on the stipulation) that the 
execution itself does not violate the inmate’s rights, then physician participation, aimed at 
reducing his risk of suffering, would not disrespect the prisoner, unless, perhaps, the inmate did 
not want a physician involved. 
One might object that intentionally exposing a research subject to risks posed by non-
clinically-indicated biopsies, lumbar puncture, or other research risks is morally distant from 
participating in a practice that deliberately kills. Administering a lethal injection intentionally is 
different than intentionally exposing someone to a low risk of serious harm. But one point of our 
discussion of clinical research is that if the practice of punishment is of great social value and 
morally justified, physicians need not construe the practice’s goal as “killing” any more than 
they should construe medical research’s goal as “exposing people to risks that are not in their 
best self-interest to bear.” The important goal of research is to produce valuable knowledge. The 
(stipulated) important goal of the practice of lethal injection would be to serve justice, save 
innocent lives, or whatever end allegedly justifies its existence. 
The objection, though, is worth contemplating further. It highlights that it would be more 
difficult psychologically for physicians, on average, to administer a lethal injection than a non-
clinically-indicated biopsy, given the way physicians are socialized by the profession. That 
physicians are trained to adhere to the Hippocratic ethic is good for society. But the fortunate 
fact that physicians generally would find it more difficult psychologically to administer a lethal 
injection only speaks in favor of not requiring any particular doctor to participate. No law or 
institution should ever force a physician to provide his or her skills to an execution. Not 
requiring a particular physician to participate is different than permitting doctors to do so.  
     
 
Doctors’ Cultural Authority and the Morality of Capital Punishment 
The morality of capital punishment is also relevant to the ethical stance against physician 
participation because of concern that physician presence adds legitimacy to the practice. 
Jonathan Groner, an opponent of physician participation, argues that medicalization of 
executions legitimizes the practice in the same disturbing way that “[m]edicalization allowed 
Nazi physicians – and ordinary citizens – to endorse the necessity of killing.”98 Groner cites a 
Nazi doctor who claimed that some people represent a “gangrenous appendix in the body of 
mankind,” and therefore must be removed.99 A California court argued similarly that a murderer 
is a “cancer on society” that must be surgically eliminated.100 Groner realizes that these 
rationalizations offered by the Nazis and the court “are … used to justify capital punishment, 
regardless of the execution method.”101 His argument against physician involvement is that  
lethal injection, because of its medical appearance, has made this type of 
reasoning more compelling. Physicians who participate in lethal injection could 
argue that the procedure is clinical and therefore humane to the prisoner, and, for 




Let us concede that physician participation and medical language describing executions make 
pro-death penalty arguments “more compelling.” These stipulated facts would speak against 
physician involvement in lethal injection only if there is something morally questionable about 
the death penalty. If the death penalty truly is required by justice, then making pro-death-penalty 
arguments more compelling would be morally good rather than problematic. On the other hand, 
if capital punishment is barbaric or otherwise morally unjustified, then physicians have strong 
reason not to lend their “cultural cachet”103 to it. Below we will discuss whether that strong 
consideration against participation would outweigh the reason to help lower the inmate’s risk of 
     
suffering. Here, it is important to acknowledge the multiple ways in which the arguments against 
participation depend on an assessment of the death penalty’s value.  
 
Assessing Arguments in Support of Physician Participation 
Proponents of physician participation do not advocate a redefinition of core principles of medical 
ethics. They argue that respect for the condemned prisoner – a desire to act in his best interests – 
justifies physician involvement. Though this pro-participation argument is strong, we have seen 
that the public good should also have purchase on the scope of physician obligations. In some 
contexts, like medical research, the social value of medical research provides good reason to 
investigate whether doctors may ethically use their medical skills on individuals in ways that 
cause some harm or risk. In other contexts, reasons related to the social good might imply that 
physicians should abstain from offering their skills to a practice, even though participation 
would advance the best interests of a potential individual patient. With regard to executions, 
proponents of physician participation must consider societal reasons for doctors not to 
participate, and such deliberation requires consideration of capital punishment’s moral status. 
 
Complicity and the Morality of Capital Punishment 
 To begin, if the death penalty is immoral, then willing participation in an execution represents 
complicity in an immoral act and, as such, would be prima facie wrongful. A discussion of 
complicity within criminal law will be helpful.  
The legal doctrine of accomplice liability recognizes that an agent may be blameworthy 
for the acts of another. When an agent chooses to assist another’s wrongful act, she voluntarily 
identifies herself with the wrongdoer’s actions, at least to some degree. Even if one’s motivation 
     
for assisting is beneficent, she cannot escape the social fact that intentional assistance in 
wrongdoing expresses some identification with the wrongful act. As such, complicity in 
wrongdoing is prima facie wrongful. A complicit agent may have an excuse (e.g., insanity, 
duress), but otherwise her assistance may be morally permissible only if a justification exists for 
committing the prima facie wrong of assisting in wrongdoing. 
 Assuming that complicity for moral wrongdoing parallels the legal doctrine, complicity 
involves assisting a primary actor (actus reus) while having a proscribed state of mind (mens 
rea). The previous paragraph briefly touched on the latter requirement: as a general rule, 
accomplice liability involves intentional assistance. If a physician intentionally assists an 
execution, and all executions are wrongful, then the physician possesses the mens rea for 
complicity in moral wrongdoing.  
However, as evidenced by our moral experience and many aspects of criminal law,
104
 an 
agent’s motives also impact the moral quality of his assistance. It matters morally whether a 
defendant killed his father because he was motivated to collect insurance money or to honor his 
father’s request not to live if unable to care for himself.105 Also, as evidenced by the necessity 
defense, motive can also serve to exculpate an agent from liability if she committed the prima 
facie wrongful act with the purpose of avoiding an even greater harm.
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 Thus, a physician’s 
motivation in participating in an execution is relevant to determining the moral status of her 
involvement. If capital punishment is immoral and participation implies complicity, the 
physician’s degree of moral blameworthiness (if blameworthy at all) will depend, in part, on her 
motivation, such as whether she participates solely to minimize the inmate’s risk of pain or to 
inflict the punishment herself.  
 With regard to actual assistance, the degree to which an agent assists in wrongdoing 
     
matters morally. But, again assuming a parallel between morality and criminal law, even trivial 
assistance is sufficient to establish accomplice liability.
107
 Encouragement through psychological 
or moral support suffices.
108
  
 Physician involvement does lend moral support to the practice. This fact explains why 
death penalty proponents – at least initially – sought physician involvement and increased 
medicalization of executions. Their aim was to make the public as comfortable as possible with 
executions. Presumably, physician involvement can strengthen or maintain public support for 
executions by creating the image of a caring doctor overseeing a hospital-type procedure in 
which an inmate peacefully falls asleep. At present, many death penalty supporters argue against 
the need for physician involvement because of inmates’ litigation claim that physician 
participation is constitutionally required. But putting aside the constitutional claim, the 
involvement of doctors serves the state by lending an aura of legitimacy to the practice.
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One might object that physicians do not really assist the perpetuation of executions 
because few, if any, voters would change their opinion about the death penalty should physicians 
not participate; states will continue to execute prisoners regardless of the means of execution. 
The objection essentially is that physician assistance at an execution could not qualify as 
immoral complicity because a physician’s involvement would not be a but-for cause of the death 
penalty’s persistence. However, the objection is unpersuasive because causation is not an 
element of accomplice liability. Even if a defendant’s assistance was not a but-for cause of the 
principal actor’s crime, the defendant is complicit in the crime.110 Complicity implies 
blameworthiness for the acts of others. The only causation analysis relevant to complicity 
regards the causal relationship between the principal agent’s actions and the prohibited harm. If 
an accomplice provides either a weapon or psychological support to another who plans a 
     
robbery, the accomplice is morally blameworthy for the robber’s crime even if the robber would 
have committed the crime without the accomplice’s support. The state need not prove that the 
defendant’s assistance was a but-for cause of the crime.  
Kenneth Baum, a proponent of physician involvement, agrees that “physician 
participation may have the consequence of providing a surface appearance of humanity or adding 
an aura of medical legitimacy to the execution process[,]” and that “[t]his is undoubtedly a 
troubling proposition.”111 However, Baum responds that this “troubling proposition” is only a 
“concern with the death penalty itself, not physician participation.”112 Baum continues: “The 
unease that underlies this potential whitewashing of the core identity of the death penalty 
concerns the morality of any state-sanctioned taking of life, not the involvement of physicians in 
carrying out that penalty.”113 Baum joins the list of commentators deeming the morality of 
capital punishment irrelevant to the ethics of physician participation. But our discussion of 
complicity demonstrates why the morality of capital punishment is crucial to the ethics of 
physician participation. Baum states that the “physician’s obligation is to the patient, not to the 
political agenda of special interest groups – not even to the American Medical Association.”114 
Baum fails to realize that the morality of the death penalty is relevant, not because a physician 
owes anything to the “political agenda” of any organization, but because physicians have 
obligations to their fellow citizens. If the death penalty is unjust (or worse), then participating 
doctors will be complicit in unjust (or worse) actions, which means, at the least, they commit a 
very serious prima facie wrong.  
 Article 3 of United Nations Resolution 37 reflects this position regarding complicity and 
the moral status of the death penalty. 
It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, as well as an offence under 
     
applicable international instruments, for health personnel, particularly physicians, 
to engage, actively or passively, in acts which constitute participation in, 
complicity in, incitement to or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, inhuman 




Obviously, many opponents of the death penalty, including some former U.S. Supreme Court 
justices, argue that the death penalty is cruel, inhuman, and degrading.
116
 Deciding whether a 
participating physician is complicit in wrongdoing requires assessment of their claims. 
 
Slippery Slope Concerns and the Morality of Capital Punishment  
Some critics of physician involvement argue that physician participation damages medicine’s 
caring ethos. Some suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that the damage to that caring ethos leads to 
a slippery slope where we inevitably see Nazis and their atrocities at the bottom.
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 Condemning 
physician participation, Alfred Freedman and Abraham Halpern, write: 
The history of the twentieth century gives us many examples of how compromises lead 
us down a slippery slope to disaster and abandonment of ethical principles. The rationale 
that physicians should assist in the administration of justice, insofar as capital punishment 
is concerned, is frighteningly reminiscent of how German physicians justified their 
involvement in the torture and killing of thousands of innocent human beings and carried 





Baum rejects this “slippery slope” concern. However, contrary to his claims, his defense 
of physician participation implicitly appeals to moral judgments about the social worth and 
moral status of capital punishment. Baum identifies some moral distinctions between Nazi 
doctors and American death penalty: capital punishment has been democratically endorsed in 
death penalty jurisdictions, as opposed to policies in Nazi Germany; a death penalty 
jurisdiction’s goal is to give effect to the voters’ will; death row inmates had trials with the 
protection of Constitutional rights; and “[w]e do not arbitrarily choose whom to execute.”119 
     
Baum’s observations are undoubtedly morally relevant to a comparison of the American death 
penalty and the horrors of Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, Baum’s response fails to recognize that 
the death penalty can still be barbaric and unjust even if it is not the moral equivalent of Nazi 
atrocities. Even if not on par with Nazi atrocities, the capital system could be sufficiently unjust 
to give doctors strong reason not to be complicit in the practice or seen as endorsing it.  
Is the death penalty sufficiently unjust to give physicians reason to avoid involvement? 
Baum does not explicitly address that question, but some of his arguments entail his answer. In 
his response to the “Nazi slippery slope concerns,” he writes that “[w]e do not arbitrarily choose 
whom to execute.”120 Baum acknowledges that studies show that arbitrary factors (such as the 
victim’s race) affect how the death penalty is distributed in the United States. But clearly he does 
not find the moral flaws with the American death penalty so serious as to require physicians to 
disassociate themselves with the practice and signal to society that it is too unjust for their 
participation.
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 He further states that “as long as state ordered executions persist, physicians’ 
primary ethical obligation is to make them as painless and humane as possible for the 
condemned.”122 But if the death penalty is gravely unjust and perhaps evil, and if physician 
involvement only slightly reduces the risk of suffering, then physicians’ primary obligation 
might be outweighed by their obligations to humanity to take a stand against injustice and avoid 
complicity. Baum’s defense of physician participation – like the arguments of his opponents – 
rests on his perceptions about the morality of the American death penalty. 
 
Is the Moral Status of Capital Punishment All That Matters? 
Recall that some supporters of physician participation argue that lethal injection is a non-medical 
procedure and, as such, the Hippocratic duty of patient loyalty is inapplicable. One immediate 
     
response is that even if the Hippocratic ethic is inapplicable, a physician’s actions can be 
immoral on other grounds. One might argue that if the Hippocratic ethic is irrelevant, then the 
moral status of the physician’s actions is entirely dependent on the moral status of the relevant 
practice. Robert Veatch does argue that the moral status of physician participation in a non-
clinical-care activity, such as a lethal injection, is determined completely by the moral status of 
the practice itself:  
If the society is correct in executing criminals, surely it is within its right to construct the 
role of physician professional in such a way that some of its members . . . can participate 
in executions. On the other hand, if the society should not be executing any criminals, 
then it should not formulate any of its medical professional roles in a way that they 




 Even if ultimately unpersuasive, Veatch’s view has a certain virtue. Imagine a physician 
who insists that justice requires the state to have the death penalty, but also believes that 
physicians’ professional integrity prohibits their participation in executions. On this view, 
because someone has to be executioner, someone else may kill, but participation would be 
morally beneath a doctor. One might accuse this physician of having a “holier than thou” elitist 
attitude about her profession. Veatch’s position stays clear of any such objection. Physicians are 
not on some higher moral plane than everyone else. If the death penalty is justified, no one’s 
hands are too pristine to be executioner. 
 This appealing feature of Veatch’s account, though, should not persuade if strong reasons 
that do not entail moral elitism counsel against participation. Orin Guidry, as president of the 
American Society of Anesthesiologists, argued that such reasons exist. Urging members to “steer 
clear” of executions, Guidry’s concern was public trust in anesthesia and anesthesiologists:  
The more the execution looks like an anesthetic, the less comfortable patients are likely 
to be with anesthesia. Surgery is already a frightening time and one in which patients 
need to trust their anesthesiologist. The last thing patients need is to equate the [operating 
     
room] with a death chamber, to equate anesthetic drugs with death drugs, or to have in 




Guidry’s argument does not entail moral elitism. It does not suggest that anesthesiologists are 
“too good” to get their hands dirty. Rather, it claims that anesthesiologist-participation would 
have bad societal consequences, which would not result from the participation of others. The 
claim is that anesthesiologists would have reason not to participate – reasons that do not apply to 
others – because the societal consequences of anesthesiologist-participation differ from the likely 
consequences from others participating in executions. The argument goes to protecting the 
“therapeutic mission [as] the professions’ primary role and the core of physicians’ professional 
identity.”125 Black and Fairbrother raise a similar concern, stating that participating physicians 
“contravene[] . . . the trust that society has placed in them.”126 
Guidry’s argument may rest on a dubious empirical assumption that physician 
participation actually causes public distrust in anesthesiologists or anesthesia. Nonetheless, 
Veatch’s view is unpersuasive even if Guidry’s arguments do not provide a counterexample. 
Stipulate that capital punishment or other non-clinical-care practice in which physicians 
participate is immoral. Even if that practice is immoral, physician participation could be morally 
acceptable. Consider a society in which a woman’s, but not a man’s, virginity is a prerequisite to 
marriage. A woman, who plans to marry but whose hymen has been ruptured, asks her 
gynecologist for hymen reconstruction surgery. Let us reasonably assume that the requested 
procedure would contribute to a practice which is immoral because it discriminates against 
women.
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 As such, “professionals who participate in the procedure would be complicit” in 
perpetuating wrongful discrimination
128
 and thereby would commit a prima facie wrong. But 
now assume the woman will suffer very serious consequences without the surgery. In some 
     
cultures, failing the virginity requirement could result in “women’s expulsion from their families 
and communities, terminated betrothal, divorce, personal violence, and at its most extreme, so-
called ‘honor killing,’ usually by close family members.”129 If a patient faces a possible honor 
killing, the ethics of the gynecologist’s decision to grant or refuse the requested procedure is not 
determined by the moral status of the practice within which the request was made. Any 
complicity in contributing to a discriminatory practice is justified by the need to protect the 
patient’s life. Likewise, even if the practice of capital punishment is immoral, an anesthesiologist 





Should legislators require or ban participation by a physician or other medical health 
professional on its jurisdiction’s execution team? A separate legal question is whether state 
medical boards should ever discipline doctors for participation. However, as Ty Alper 
demonstrates, it is unlikely that any state medical board in a capital jurisdiction has legal 
authority to discipline a physician for participation.
130
  In addition, even if a medical board had 
that authority, it should not discipline physicians for participating to reduce an inmate’s risk of 
suffering, given the complexity of the ethical question and the reasonableness of concluding that 
it is morally permissible to participate with that motivation. Thus, the practical question is 
whether legislatures should direct their respective departments of corrections to include or ban 
physicians or other medical professionals from execution teams. 
 The foregoing arguments strongly support the proposition that legislators who favor the 
     
death penalty should require participation of physicians or other highly trained medical 
professionals. Assuming, as they believe, that the death penalty is morally justified and socially 
valuable, then the case against physician participation is very weak. First, if the death penalty 
truly does advance justice, then it is good if physicians lend their cultural authority to the 
practice and ease citizens’ consciences about the execution procedure. Second, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the respect owed to the condemned inmate permits a physician to try to reduce the 
risk of suffering. Third, the arguments examined in Part III against physician participation – 
based on an alleged morality internal to medicine, on being a primary cause of death, and on the 
non-medical status of lethal injection – are unpersuasive.   
In addition, pro-death penalty legislators need not be moved by a concern for the public’s 
trust in anesthesiologists. Of course, any legislator should want to protect the physician-patient 
relationship and avoid causing undue anxiety for surgery patients. However, these concerns do 
not support a ban on physician participation. Ironically, the position of the American Medical 
Association and other professional organizations actually solidifies the case in support of 
physician participation because it alleviates these concerns. When news outlets publicize the 
participation of a physician in an execution, they also publicize the fact that medical 
organizations oppose such participation. The professional codes of ethics allow the public to 
view physicians who participate as rare outliers who reject their profession’s norms. Thus, the 
codes of ethics guard against any erosion of public trust in anesthesiologists and other physicians 
that otherwise might be caused by physician participation.     
 For anti-death-penalty lawmakers in capital jurisdictions, the practical implications are 
less clear and more complex. Assuming that the death penalty is immoral and anesthesiologists 
could reduce the risk of suffering, a satisfactory ethical analysis nonetheless would be complex 
     
and depend on many related details. For example, the degree to which the death penalty is 
unjustified – whether the moral status of capital punishment is a close case (it is morally 
impermissible but barely so)
131
 or whether it represents an absolutely evil and barbaric 
practice
132
 -- would matter. The degree of the death penalty’s wrongfulness would then have to 
be balanced against the degree to which an anesthesiologist’s involvement reduces the inmate’s 
risk of torture. If the death penalty is barbaric and physicians only slightly reduce the risk of 
unnecessary suffering, then the case for banning physician participation is very strong: in those 
circumstances, we should not want physicians lending their cultural authority to the death 
penalty and easing the public’s conscience about executions. On the other hand, if the death 
penalty is unjustified but barely so, and if physician involvement significantly reduces the risk to 
each inmate, then the case for physician involvement is stronger. On those stipulated facts, the 
decision for the anti-death-penalty legislator is more difficult and sensitive to the details. No 
algorithm reveals the right answer.  
 
For Professional Medical Organizations 
Should medical professional organizations change their ethical codes to acknowledge the 
relationship between the ethics of participation and the moral status of the death penalty? If the 
AMA wants to retain its ethical ban on participation, should it remove from its code any 
suggestion that the morality of the death penalty is irrelevant? Before directly addressing this 
question, let us acknowledge that such organizations do not have self-interested reason to take a 
particular stand on capital punishment. The AMA – the largest association within organized 
medicine - holds out itself to prospective members as an aggressive advocate for physicians’ 
interests and provider of benefits to physicians in their daily practice.
133
 It specifies its core 
     
mission as “promot[ing] the science and art of medicine and the betterment of public health.”134 
Insofar as the AMA hopes to represent as many doctors as possible, it has good reason to avoid 
alienating any physicians with a stance on capital punishment or any other controversial political 
issue. The expertise of organized physicians also fails to provide reason for the AMA to take a 
stand on capital punishment or other political issue apart from its relevance to medicine. 
Professional medical societies have good reasons to develop ethical standards for medical 
practice
135
 based on their knowledge and critical experience regarding the practice of medicine. 
But they have no special interest in, knowledge of, or insight into the death penalty. 
 In addition, it is also important to consider that physicians and other health professionals 
are participating in executions. Given that fact, these organizations have good reason not to 
change their codes. Their ethical stance prevents the potential negative effects to the physician-
patient relationship and public trust that worry Dr. Guidry and other opponents of physician 
participation. Thus, even if the death penalty is morally justified, the primary mission of these 
organizations supports their clear and simple ban on participation. 
 Medical professional organizations would have additional reasons not to change their 
codes if the capital punishment is an immoral practice. Condemning the participation of medical 
health professionals is the closest these organizations can come to condemning the death penalty 
without doing so explicitly and alienating actual and potential members.
136
 Second, their ethical 
ban would effectively represent a refusal, on the part of their members, to be complicit in the 






     
Conclusion 
The ethics of physician participation is complicated. Contrary to so much commentary, many 
factors are relevant to ethically assessing physician involvement. The moral status of the death 
penalty is crucial. It affects whether participating physicians are complicit in an immoral 
practice, thereby committing a prima facie moral wrong. If they are complicit, the seriousness of 
that prima facie wrong depends on the degree to which the death penalty is unjustified. The 
moral status of capital punishment is also important because physician involvement may render 
the practice more palatable and morally acceptable to the public. But the moral status of the 
practice is not all that matters. Other factors include the respect owed to the inmate and whether 
he requests physician participation. In considering the respect owed to the inmate, it is important 
to weigh the degree to which involvement of a physician or other health professional can reduce 
the actual risk of suffering unnecessary pain. In other non-clinical-care contexts in which 
medical health professionals participate (such as military medicine and forensic psychiatry), 
additional considerations will be relevant. But the ethics of physician participation in those 
contexts, too, is complex and depends on the moral status of the relevant practice. Appeals to the 
Hippocratic ethic and traditional principles of medical ethics are insufficient. 
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